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                              Abstract 
 
     In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutual 
authentication protocol for low-cost Radio 
Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags. Although 
RFID systems promise a fruitful future, security and 
privacy concerns have affected the proliferation of 
the RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims to 
protect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacks 
and especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. We 
found that the majority of the proposed protocols 
failed to resist this kind of attack. To analyse our 
proposed protocol, we provide an informal analysis. 
In addition, we formally analyse the security of the 
proposed protocol via using automated formal 
verification tools such as CasperFDR and AVISPA.  
We also employed an up-to-date privacy model to 
evaluate the privacy of the RFID protocol. The 
results show that the proposed protocol achieves 
tag’s data secrecy, privacy and authentication under 
the presence of a passive adversary. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
     RFID is a wireless technology that uses radio 
signals to identify tags attached to objects. It 
provides more advantages than a typical Automatic 
Identification Technologies such as bar codes; thus, 
it started to conquer the new mass markets [1]. 
     It is composed of three main components, 
namely, a tag, a reader and a backend server. The 
reader broadcasts a radio frequency (RF) signal to 
power, communicate and receive data from RFID 
tags without physical contact. The RFID tag is an 
identification device attached to an item; it transmits 
the stored information to the nearby reader(s) 
through the RF channel. The reader sends the tag's 
data to the backend server which stores data about 
the RFID tags it manages [2]. 
     RFID is being used in many applications that 
require high level of security and privacy such as in 
access control systems, identification of products in 
the supply chain or payment system [3]. Therefore, it 
needs to use different security measures to protect 
against feasible attacks. The wireless communication 
between the tag and reader might allow an attacker to 
eavesdrop on a session, modify the transmitted 
messages, and prevent some messages from reaching 
their target. Moreover, if the tag's data is sent in the 
clear or fixed to any reader, a malicious reader can 
obtain tag's data and/or track a specific user or object 
location [4]. 
    Another area that affects the adoption of RFID 
systems is performance. A low-cost RFID tags 
cannot perform computationally intensive security 
cryptographic functions, as it offers tightly 
constrained computational power and storage 
capacity [5]. Therefore, it supports simple bitwise 
operations such as XOR, and concatenation 
operators, and a Pseudo Random Number Generator 
(PRNG).  
     In order to ensure privacy and security of the 
proposed protocol, we use hash functions. Best 
practices should be used for the implementation of 
the hash functions. For example, the authors in [5] 
presented a hardware implementation of Keccak, 
which has been selected as the winner of the NIST 
SHA-3 competition in 2012, which aims to use the 
lowest power. The designed hardware can be 
implemented in RFID tags with only 5522 gates, and 
consumes 12.5 μW of power.  
    In this paper we aim to avoid the security and 
privacy issues found in previous related work and in 
the meantime improve the performance of the RFID 
systems. In particular, we found that some of the 
proposed protocols [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] failed to resist 
desynchronisation attacks.  
     In addition, there are other security and privacy 
issues that are not addressed previously such as 
replay attacks [12, 13], tag and server impersonation 
attacks [14, 12, 8, 7, 6, 15, 16, 17]. Moreover, some 
recent research focused on the security side and 
ignored performance [7, 8, 13, 12, 11, 17, 16, 18], 
which require the server to search all tags in the 
system in order to identify a single tag. 
     To confirm that the proposed protocol meets the 
main secrecy, privacy and authentication 
requirements, we verify its secrecy and 
authentication using two model checking tools 
namely CasperFDR [19] and AVISPA [20]. 
Moreover, the privacy of the protocol is tested using 
a privacy model proposed by [21] to evaluate the 
privacy of the RFID protocols. The results of these 
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models show that the proposed protocol achieves 
tag’s data secrecy, privacy and authentication under 
the presence of a passive adversary. 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in 
Section 2, the protocol's main goals and requirements 
are discussed. In Section 3, we briefly review some 
related work and examine their weaknesses. In 
Section 4, we explain our proposed protocol in 
detail. In Section 5, we analyse the proposed 
protocol with respect to informal analysis, privacy 
model, and mechanical formal analysis using 
CasperFDR and AVISPA. In Section 6, we provide 
the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Goals and requirements of the 
proposed protocol 
 
     When designing an RFID protocol, consideration 
should be given to the following: 
 
     Privacy: We need to take into account that the 
tag’s data should remain secret and not revealed to 
any malicious reader, thus providing anonymity to 
the tag. Another notion related to privacy is 
untraceability; if the data being sent from the tag to 
the reader is static or linked to data sent previously, 
the tag’s holder location can be tracked without his 
knowledge. Therefore, the protocol should provide a 
mechanism to protect the tag’s data from being 
breached. 
     Security: Due to the wireless communication 
between the tag and reader, a passive attacker can 
observe and manipulate the communication channel 
between the readers and tags. In this paper, we focus 
on three common techniques to violate the secrecy of 
the system namely replay attack, desynchronisation 
attack and tag and server impersonation attacks. 
     To elaborate, the designed protocol should resist 
the following attacks [22]: 
 
- Resistance to replay attacks: The 
adversary can eavesdrop on the 
communication between reader and tag, 
obtain the exchanged message(s) and 
resend it repeatedly. Therefore, the 
generated messages should be fresh to 
the protocol session to protect against 
replay attacks. 
- Resistance to desynchronisation 
attacks: The adversary can modify the 
flow of the messages and block 
messages from reaching their target 
causing desynchronisation between the 
two legitimate parties. Therefore, the 
main server should store the old and 
new values of the tag in order to 
authenticate the tag and reach 
synchronisation even if the attacker 
blocked any messages. 
- Resistance to tag and server 
impersonation attacks: In this attack, 
the attacker sends a message to the 
server that claims to come from a 
legitimate tag, and this message 
fabrication enables the attacker to 
masquerade as a legitimate tag and vice 
versa. Hence, the responses should be 
encrypted so that creates no meaning to 
the attacker.  
- An active attacker can physically 
compromise the RFID tag’s memory 
and obtain the secret data. Active 
attacks are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
     Mutual authentication: The protocol should 
provide a mutual entity authentication, where the 
communication should take place between legitimate 
entities such as tag, reader and server and provide 
assurance to the receiver (server) about the identity 
of the sender (tag) and vice versa. 
 
    3. Related Work 
 
     We start with the first privacy-enhancing 
RFID protocols proposed by [14]. Weis proposed 
a protocol [14] namely the hash-based access 
control (HAC) (referred here as WP). The 
proposed scheme uses the saved secret key (K) 
and hash function (H) to lock the tag. The tag 
calculates the hash of the key (HK) and sends it 
to all queries it receives. To unlock the tag, the 
server sends (K) in the clear to the tag and the tag 
checks that H(K) is equal to the stored (HK); if 
they are equal, then the tag unlocks itself and 
replies with its (ID). Kim et al. [23] formally 
analysed this protocol by using CasperFDR and 
the verification demonstrates that an intruder may 
obtain the secret key and the tag’s ID, as they are 
sent in the clear. Moreover, the value of (HK) is 
static; thus can be traced by an intruder. 
     An extension of the hash lock scheme based 
on Pseudo Random Functions (PRFs) has also 
been proposed in [12] (referred here as WP2). In 
this scheme, a tag generates a random number 
(R) and sends H(ID, R) and R, where ID is the 
tag’s ID. To identify a tag, a server computes the 
hash of each stored ID until it finds a match with 
the value it receives from the tag. Then, the 
server sends the matching ID to the tag in clear to 
unlock it. This approach, however, still 
vulnerable to replay attacks and tag 
impersonation attacks as shown in [24]. 
     Ohkubo et al. [13] suggested an alternative 
RFID hash chained protocol (referred to here as 
OP). This protocol focused on protecting the 
RFID privacy by achieving forward security, 
which is the knowledge of a tag’s current internal 
state could help identify the tag’s past 
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interactions allowing tracking of the tag owner’s 
past behaviour [24]. The tag and server store a 
secret (s). The tag updates (s) in every session by 
using a hash function (h). Then in the next 
transaction the tag uses a second hash function 
(g) and sends g(h(si+1) to the server where (si+1) is 
the updated secret to be used in the next 
transaction. This scheme achieves forward 
security. However, this scheme is still vulnerable 
to replay attacks [25]. In [25], the author 
proposed an extended protocol by adding random 
numbers to the exchanged messages to avoid 
reply attacks. 
     Molnar et al. [26] suggested an RFID mutual 
authentication protocol (referred here as MP). 
This approach uses the challenge-response 
protocol as well as PRNG functions to provide 
privacy for RFID system. The tag and server 
share a key (k) which is used in calculating the 
PRNG functions. The server sends a random 
number (r1) as a challenge to the tag. The tag 
sends M1=ID  fk(0 || r1 || r2) where (f) is a 
pseudo random number function, and a random 
number (r2) to the server in order to be 
authenticated. Once the server successfully 
authenticates the tag, it sends M2=ID  fk(1 ||r1 || 
r2) to be authenticated by the tag. However, this 
protocol does not resist traceability as the value 
of the secret key (k) is fixed; hence the attacker 
can trace the previous communications related to 
this tag [24]. 
     Dimitriou [9] proposed another RFID         
authentication protocol to enforce user privacy 
(referred here as DP). This approach uses a 
challenge-response protocol, hash function, and 
keyed hash functions. The tag only stores the 
tag’s identifier (ID), which serves as a key to 
calculate the keyed hash function. The server 
stores the tag identifier (ID) and the hash of the 
tag identifier (HID), used as an index to retrieve 
the tag’s data. When the server successfully 
authenticates the tag, it updates (ID) to g(ID), 
where (g) is a one-way function and sends a third 
message to the tag. The tag checks the received 
value of the third message. If the check is 
successful, the tag updates (ID) to g(ID). This 
protocol is still vulnerable to DoS attacks [24]; if 
the third message (M3) sent by the server is 
blocked by an attacker, then the server will 
update the identifier (ID) while the tag keeps the 
old value of the identifier, resulting in a 
desynchronisation between the server and tag 
[24].  
     Duc et al. [8] presented an RFID mutual 
authentication protocol conforming to the 
Electronic Product code (EPC) Class 1 
Generation 2 standard (EPCCIG2) (referred here 
as DucP). This scheme uses simple primitives 
such as PRNG and Cyclic Redundancy Code 
(CRC) functions, as they are supported in the 
EPCC1G2 standard. The PRNG is used for 
updating the secret key while the CRC is for 
detecting any errors occur during the 
transmission of the messages. The server and tag 
store a secret key, which is updated when the 
reader sends an end session to both ends. 
However, this scheme still has some weaknesses 
such as, vulnerability to DoS attacks, tag 
impersonation attacks, and traceability [7]. 
     Chien et al. [8] introduced another mutual 
authentication protocol for RFID conforming to 
the EPCC1G2 standard; this is an improved 
version of Duc et al. protocol (referred here as 
CP). The proposed protocol requires the server 
and tag to produce random numbers to prevent 
replay attack. The tag keeps a static EPC as the 
tag identifier, and an access key (K) and 
authentication key (P), which are updated after 
each successful authentication. The server also 
maintains the same values as well as the old and 
new access and authentication keys to avoid DoS 
attacks and prevent forward traceability. The 
protocol uses simple cryptographic primitives, 
such as a PRNG and a CRC. After the server 
authenticates the tag, it updates the data except 
for the EPC identifier which is static. This 
protocol is vulnerable to tag impersonation 
attacks, and tracking of previous transactions as 
cited in [24]. Moreover, according to [15], this 
protocol is prone to DoS attacks and server 
impersonation attacks. Finally, [27] shows that 
this protocol permits location tracking due to the 
use of the linear properties of CRC which is used 
as a checksum algorithm. 
          Another lightweight RFID mutual 
authentication protocol was proposed in [10] 
using a Shrinking Algorithm [28] (referred here 
as SG). In this protocol a shrinking algorithm 
generates a different random key that is used for 
the encryption purpose. The tag generates an 
encryption key (CSGK1) using the shrinking 
algorithm that takes a shared secret between the 
tag and the database (K1) as an input, and 
computes M=CSGK1  (ID || S), where ID is the 
tag’s ID and S is a random number generated by 
the reader. Once the database authenticates the 
tag, it generates another random encryption key 
(CSGK2) using the shrinking algorithm, and 
computes ID=CSGK2  (ID). Finally, both of 
the tag and database will update their values. 
    The authors claim that their protocol reaches 
the synchronization between the tag and database 
by maintaining a list of current and previous 
values in the database. However, we found that 
this protocol is vulnerable to a desynchronisation 
attack as if the attacker blocks the database’s 
message from reaching the tag just twice then the 
tag’s data will not match the server’s data. 
Moreover, if the attacker tampered with Meta-id, 
International Journal of RFID Security and Cryptography (IJRFIDSC), Volume 1, Issues 3/4, Sep/Dec 2012                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Journal’s Title, Volume X, Issue X, Year 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 4 
 
which is used for retrieving the tag’s data in the 
database, then the database will not be able to 
retrieve the tag’s data and thus fails to 
authenticate the tag. 
     Song et al. [6] proposed an efficient RFID 
authentication protocol for low-cost tags (referred 
here as SP). This protocol uses the hash function, 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) and 
PRNG. Each tag stores the hash of a secret (s) 
namely (t), and the server stores the old and new 
values of the secret (snew, sold), the hashed secret 
(tnew, told) and the tag’s information (D). This 
scheme uses a challenge-response protocol and 
supports updating data when the mutual 
authentication is achieved. Cai et al. [29] 
presented a paper showing that Song et al.’s 
protocol does not provide protection against tag 
impersonation attacks. Moreover, Rizomiliotis et 
al. [30] found that an attacker can impersonate 
the server even without accessing the internal 
data of a tag and launch a DoS attacks. 
    A new version of the SP has been proposed in 
[24] (referred to here as the SP2). The protocol 
uses the same data as in the SP except that the 
construction of the exchanged message (M2 and 
M3) has been changed. In the new version of the 
protocol, the author claimed that the proposed 
protocol resists DoS attacks. However, we 
discovered that an attacker is able to 
desynchronise a tag without even compromising 
the internal data stored in the tag [31]. 
     Poulopoulos et al. [11] proposed an RFID 
mutual authentication protocol using a hash 
function and PRNG (referred here as PP). The 
protocol uses a challenge response scheme. The 
exchanged messages are protected using a hash 
function. The value of the secret key (K) in the 
tag is updated after each successful 
authentication. The server stores the old and new 
values of the identifier (ID) and (K), and they are 
updated after authenticating the tag. However, we 
found that this protocol is vulnerable to 
desynchronisation attack [32]. 
     Yeh et al. [15] proposed an improved version 
of Chien et al.’s RFID authentication protocol 
conforming to the EPCC1G2 standard (referred 
here as YP). The data kept in the server and tag is 
the same as in Chien et al.’s protocol, except that 
their protocol uses an index (C) to avoid DoS 
attacks and database overloading. The 
initialisation and authentication phases are quite 
different from those of Chien et al.’s protocol; 
they do not use CRC functions; only PNRG 
functions, thus blocking the bad linear properties 
of the CRC function [27]. Although this protocol 
prevents DoS attacks, it is still vulnerable to 
forward traceability, tag impersonation attacks, 
and server impersonation attacks as pointed in 
[16]. 
    Another RFID mutual authentication protocol 
called O-FRAP was proposed in [18]. In this 
protocol, each tag and the server share a key (K) 
and a pseudonym (r) which are updated in every 
session. In this paper, the authors claimed that the 
proposed protocol resists DoS attacks and 
achieves forward security. However, [33] stated 
that this protocol is vulnerable to a traceability 
attacks and it fails to provide forward security by 
corrupting the target tag at the point after the tag 
outputs (Accept). 
     An improved version of Yeh et al.’s protocol 
is proposed in [16] (referred to here as YoonP). 
Their protocol uses the same data as Yeh et al.’s 
protocol and the initialisation process is also 
identical, but the authentication phase is quite 
different by adding a secret session random 
number (r2) to the exchanged massage (M1). 
Yoon et al. claims that the proposed protocol 
provides more security than that of Yeh et al.; 
however, [34] showed that eavesdropping on 
only one session of the protocol can reveal the 
tag’s secret data, as the length of data generated 
from PRNG is only 16 bit strings, which makes it 
easier for the attacker to do an exhaustive search 
to find the pre-image of the stored data; it is thus 
easy to launch a traceability attacks, DoS attacks, 
tag impersonation attacks, and server 
impersonation attacks. 
     In [17] the authors proposed an RFID mutual 
authentication protocol which is an improved 
version to the protocol proposed in [13] (referred 
here as HP). Their protocol supports the updating 
of the server’s and the tag’s secret data as well as 
using different hash functions for the 
authentication. In this scheme, the whole protocol 
depends on the secrecy of only one secret value 
(skID,i) which if it is compromised the protocol 
will be affected. Also, the value of the ID is 
static, hence it can be tracked. Moreover, we 
found that this protocol is still vulnerable to 
server impersonation attacks and 
desynchronisation attacks (only if the secret value 
is compromised). 
     Hence, a new RFID mutual authentication 
protocol that can resist such attacks found in the 
previous protocols is proposed in this paper. 
 
4. THE PROPOSED RFID 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
 
     In this section, we explain the proposed protocol 
in detail. 
 
Assumptions 
 
     We present a lightweight RFID mutual 
authentication protocol, which operates under the 
following assumptions: 
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- The communication between the reader and the 
tag is initiated by the reader, i.e. tags are 
passive. 
- The reader contacts the tag through a wireless 
channel which is susceptible to different attacks 
such as location tracking, replay attacks, DoS 
attacks and impersonation attacks. 
- The communication channel between the reader 
and server is secure.  
- The tag’s data are stored in non-volatile 
memory such as EEPROM or Flash memory, 
where they can be updated.  
- All the operations in the tag are atomic i.e. 
either all of the operations or none are 
processed. If the attacker kills the 
electromagnetic field between the reader and 
tag or simply the tag walks away from the 
reader’s signal, the tag will execute all the 
computations simultaneously or not at all. 
- We assume that the proposed protocol supports 
a multiple readers scenario, all connected to a 
central server, so that a tag can be read in many 
different locations.  
Protocol behaviour 
 
The proposed protocol has the following main 
features: 
 
- The proposed protocol uses random numbers in 
an attempt to prevent location tracking and 
replay attacks.  
- The server stores both the old and the new 
values of the data in order to prevent 
desynchronization attacks. 
-  After a successful authentication between the 
server and tag, both parties update their values 
to be used in the next transaction. 
Notation 
 
     The notation used in the proposed protocol is 
presented below: 
 
1) The notation related to the server database is, 
- IDold: The tag’s old ID  
- IDnew: The tag’s new ID  
- Kold: The old secret key  
- Knew: The new secret key  
2) The notation related to the tag is, 
- Ti: The i
th
 tag of the RFID system, 
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N 
- ID: The tag’s ID, shared with the 
server’s IDold or IDnew 
- K: The tag’s secret key shared with the 
server’s Kold or Knew 
3) Other notation used in the proposed 
protocol is, 
- x: The value kept as either new or old 
to show whether the tag uses the old or 
new values of ID and K 
- R1: A pseudo random number 
generated by the reader 
- R2: A pseudo random number 
generated by the tag and serving as a 
temporary secret for the tag 
- H: A hash function, h:{0,1}* {0,1}L, 
where L is equal to the length of the 
data 
- A  B: Message A is XORed with 
message B 
- A || B: Message A is concatenated with 
message B 
- A  B : The value of A is updated to 
that of B 
- j: The transaction number 
- N: The number of tags managed by the 
server 
 
Protocol description 
     The scheme consists of two processes namely 
initialization, and authentication. 
 
1) Initialisation Process: This stage only 
occurs during manufacturing when the 
manufacturer assigns the initial values in 
the server, and in the tag. The initialisation 
process is summarised below: 
- The server assigns random values for 
each tag it manages to (IDnew, Knew) in 
the server and (ID, K) in the tag. 
- Initially, (IDold, Kold) in the server is set 
to null. 
2) Authentication Process: The authentication 
process is shown in Table 1. 
- Reader: The reader generates a random 
number R1 of L bits and sends it to the 
tag.  
- Tag:  
 The tag generates a random 
number R2 of L bits as a 
temporary secret for the session, 
and computes: 
HID=H(ID || R1), 
M1=H(K || R1 || R2),  
M2=ID  R2 
 The tag sends HID, M1 and M2 
to the reader. 
- Reader: The reader sends R1, HID, M1, 
and M2 to the server. 
- Server:  
 For all the stored IDs, the server 
computes H(ID || R1) until it 
finds a match with the received 
value of HID: 
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 If there is a match in IDnew, then 
the server marks x=new. The 
server retrieves data (IDnew, 
Knew), extracts R2 i.e. R2=IDnew 
 M2, and re-computes M1 i.e. 
M'1=H(Knew || R1 || R2) to 
authenticate the tag.  
 If there is a match in IDold, then 
the server marks x=old, retrieves 
the data (IDold, Kold), extracts R2 
i.e. R2=IDold   M2 and re-
calculates M'1=H(Kold || R1 || R2) 
to authenticate the tag. 
 The server computes M3=H(IDx 
|| Kx || R1 || R2), and transmits it 
to the reader. 
 The server updates the data as 
follows: 
If x=new, where ID is found in 
IDnew 
IDnew
j+1
     H(IDnew
j
) 
IDold
j+1
      IDnew
j
 
Knew
j+1
    H(Knew
j
 IDnew
j+1
) 
Kold
j+1
     Knew
j
 
 
Else if x=old, where ID is found 
in IDold: 
No updates 
If there is no match in IDnew and 
IDold or M1≠M1 or M2≠M2, 
then the server sends an end 
session message to the reader to 
terminate the session. 
- Reader: Once the reader receives M3, it 
sends M3 to the tag. 
- Tag: The tag determines whether the 
received value of M3 is equal to H(ID || 
K || R1|| R2). If there is a match, the tag 
authenticates the server and updates its 
values to:  
 
ID
j+1
   H(IDj) 
K
j+1
   H(Kj  IDj+1)  
 
If the check fails or M3 is not received, 
the tag keeps the current values 
unchanged. 
 
5. Protocol analysis 
 
     In this section, we analyse the proposed protocol 
in terms of informal and formal analysis using a 
privacy model, CasperFDR and AVISPA. Finally, 
we present the expected performance measurement. 
 
5.1 Informal security analysis of the protocol 
 
     In Table 2 We compared our protocol with the 
related research work against the main requirements 
shown in Section 2. Our proposed protocol provides 
the following goals:  
 
Our proposed protocol provides the following goals:  
 
1) Tag anonymity: The tag stores two values, 
namely (ID, K) that supposed to be secret 
and not revealed to any entity except the 
legitimate server.  Only the legitimate 
server that has information related to the tag 
can extract these values.  
2) Tag location privacy (untraceability): In the 
proposed protocol, the tag’s responses are 
changed with new updated values and fresh 
random numbers, thus the attacker will 
obtain new responses every time he 
eavesdrops on a session. Moreover, if the 
previous authentication session failed and 
the tag’s data remain unchanged, HID, M1 
and M2 responses will change due to the 
existence of new fresh random numbers. 
3) Resistance to replay attack: The proposed 
protocol utilises a challenge-response 
scheme, where each party maintains a set of 
random numbers it has seen from previous 
protocol run to avoid repeated random 
numbers. Thus, when the tag or server 
detects repeated random numbers, it will 
terminate the session. 
4) Resistance to desynchronisation attack: In 
the proposed protocol, the 
desynchronisation attack is avoided via 
storing the previous values of the data 
(IDold, Kold), and thus reach synchronization. 
Moreover, the server does not update its 
data when there is a match in (IDold, Kold), it 
keeps the stored data the same. Thus when 
the attacker blocks M3 more than once 
respectively, the tag’s data (ID, K) will still 
match the server’s data (IDold, Kold).  
5) Resistance to tag impersonation attack: To 
impersonate the tag, the attacker must be 
able to compute a valid response (HID, M1 
and M2) to a server query. However, it is 
hard to compute such responses without 
knowledge of ID, and K. 
6) Resistance to server impersonation attack: 
To impersonate the server, the attacker must 
be able to compute a valid response (M3). 
However, it is hard to compute such 
responses without knowledge of IDx, Kx, 
and R2.  
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5.2 Privacy analysis 
 
     The researchers have proposed number of privacy 
models to evaluate the privacy of the RFID protocols 
such as [21, 35]. The model in [21] is summarised as 
follows: An adversary (A) controls the 
communication channel between a tag (T) and a 
reader (R) by interacting either passively or actively 
with them. The adversary can run the following 
queries: 
 
- Execute (R, T, i) query: The adversary can 
passively eavesdrop on a session (i) and obtain 
access to the exchanged messages between R 
and T. 
- Send (U, V, m, i) query: The adversary can 
perform active attacks by impersonating an 
entity such as V  T and sends a message (m) 
to entity U  R during session (i). Also, he can 
alter or block some of the exchanged messages. 
- Corrupt (T, K) query: The attacker can 
physically access the tag’s memory T and read 
the tag’s secret value (K). 
- Test (i, T0, T1) query: This query is used to 
define the untraceability test. When this query 
is invoked for session (i), a random bit b2 {0, 
1} is generated and then, A is given Tb {T0, 
T1}. Informally, A wins if he can guess the bit 
b. 
     Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined as a game 
(g) played by the adversary (A) and a collection of 
the reader and the tag instances. The game consists 
of three phases: 
 
1) Learning phase: The adversary (A) can send 
the Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries to 
any random T0 and T1 tags. 
2) Challenge phase: The adversary (A) is 
given a tag Tb  {T0, T1}, and sends any 
Execute, and Send queries to Tb. 
3) Guess phase: A terminates the game and 
outputs a bit b0, which is its guess of the 
value of b. 
     The success of A in winning (g) and breaking the 
untraceability privacy (UPriv) is achieved in terms of 
A’s advantage in distinguishing whether A received 
T0 or T1, i.e. it correctly guessing b. This is denoted 
by 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑈𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣k, where k is the security parameter. 
Now, we will evaluate the privacy of our proposed 
protocol using this model. We found that the 
adversary cannot invade the privacy of the tag and 
trace its location as shown below: 
 
1) Learning phase: The adversary eavesdrops a 
valid session between R and T0. He sends 
the Execute command and then maintains 
the following values, which are sent : 
R1, HID=H(ID0 || R1) 
M1=H(K0 || R1 || R2) 
M2= ID0  R2 
 
2) Challenge phase: A is given a tag Tb  {T0, 
T1} randomly. He starts a new session with 
Tb by impersonating the reader and sends 
R1 to Tb within the Send query and 
terminates the session. Tb responds can be: 
 
HID=H(IDb ||R1) 
M1=H(Kb || R1 || R2) 
M2= IDb  R2 
 
     However, A will not be able to guess the correct 
tag (bit b) as the received messages M1 and M2 
contain a random number (R2) generated by the tag, 
which changes in every session, and not known to 
the adversary. Moreover, regarding HID message, if 
the tag encounters a repeated random number such as 
R1, it will terminate the session. 
 
5.3 Formal Analysis of the Protocol Using 
CasperFDR 
 
     CasperFDR is a compiler that takes a high level 
description of the protocol and analyses the protocol 
description against the stated specification to show 
whether the protocol meets the main requirements. 
     Previously, researchers [36, 37] have attempted to 
model their protocol using a Communication 
Sequential Process (CSP) and a Failure-Divergence 
Refinement (FDR). CSP is a language for specifying 
the protocol behaviour. The generated CSP file is 
analysed by FDR. FDR is a model checker that 
analyses a protocol and verifies the given 
specifications. Gavin Lowe has developed  
CasperFDR tool [19], which takes a high level 
description of the protocol together with its security 
requirements and produces a CSP code checked and 
verified by FDR. 
      CasperFDR is used to verify the authentication 
and secrecy requirements of the protocol. 
Authentication has two forms of specification 
namely Agreement and NonInjectiveAgreement. 
Agreement means if Bob meets the Agreement 
specification, he confirms that Alice has run the 
same protocol, and agreed on the exchanged values. 
For example Agreement (T, S, [R1, R2, ID, K]) 
means that the tag is authenticated to the server and 
both parties agreed on the data values (R1,R2, ID, 
K), and it is one to one relationship i.e. each run of 
the tag corresponds to a unique run of the server. 
Another form of authentication specification is 
NonInjectiveAgreement which differs from 
Agreement whereas each run can be repeated and 
overlap. 
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 Table 1. Goals and requirements comparison  
                                                                                               
Table1. The proposed protocol authentication process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  
WP 
 
WP2 
 
OP 
 
MP 
 
DP 
 
DucP 
 
CP 
 
SG 
 
PP 
 
SP2 
 
YP 
 
YoonP 
 
HP 
 
Sec.4 
 
Tag 
anonymity 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Location 
privacy 
× √ √ √ × √ × √ √ √ √ × √ √ 
Replay 
attacks 
× × × √ √ × √ √ √ √ √ × √ √ 
Denial of 
service 
attacks 
√ √ √ √ × × × × × × √ √ × √ 
Tag 
impersonation 
attacks 
× × √ √ √ × × √ √ √ × × × √ 
Server 
impersonation 
attacks 
× × × × × × × √ × √ × × × √ 
Server 
IDnew,IDold,Knew,Kold 
 Reader 
 
 Tag 
ID,K 
 
 
  R1  
Generate R2 
HID=H(ID || R1) 
M1=H(K || R1 || R2) 
M2=ID  R2 
 
   HID,M1,M2  
For all the IDs, 
compute H(IDx||R1) 
Retrieve the matched IDx , Kx 
 
Mark x=new or old 
Compute  
R2=IDx  M2,  
Re-compute 
M'1=H(Kx||R1||R2) 
R1,HID,M1,M2 
 
   
Calculate 
M3=H(IDx||Kx||R1||R2) 
    
 M3    
If x=new, update: 
IDnew
j+1
     H(IDnew
j
) 
 
IDold
j+1
      IDnew
j
 
 
Knew
j+1
  H(Knew
j
 IDnew
j+1
) 
 
Kold
j+1
     Knew
j
 
 
Else if x=old,   
No updates 
  M3  
 
Re-compute   
M3=H(ID || K || R1|| R2) 
If M3 = M3 
Update: 
IDj+1   H(IDj) 
Kj+1H(Kj  IDj+1) 
 
If the check fails or M3 is 
not received, the tag keeps 
the current values 
unchanged. 
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Similarly secrecy has two forms of specification 
namely Secret and StrongSecret. Secret checks 
whether the intruder could know the secret value at 
the end of the protocol. While, StrongSecret checks 
whether the intruder can obtain the secret value 
before the protocol finishes its run. 
     CasperFDR checks the authentication and secrecy 
specifications by examining the associated events. In 
other words, Running and Commit events are 
attached to the authentication specifications. The 
server and tag are both depicted in CasperFDR as 
CSP processors. When the tag sends (HID, M1, M2, 
R1) to the server, the server performs the Running 
event, which means that the server starts running the 
protocol apparently with the tag. Then, the tag 
performs the Commit event when it receives the 
server’s reply M3, which means that the tag has 
finished a run of the protocol with the server [38]. 
     CasperFDR checks the secrecy specifications via 
an event called Claim_Secret, which is performed by 
both parties. When the tag receives the server’s 
message (M3), it performs Claim_Secret to ensure 
that (ID, K, R2) are secret [38]. This process is 
shown in Figure 1. For simplicity, we treat the server 
as a reader and a database. 
 
5.3.1 The proposed protocol requirement 
illustration in CasperFDR 
 
     Figure 1 shows how the main requirements are 
achieved in CasperFDR (the numbers in the figure 
presents the same goals shown below). The 
following goals are achieved as follow: 
 
1) Mutual authentication: Before the tag sends 
M1 and M2, it performs 
Running.T.S.[ID,K,R1,R2] event, which 
means the tag starts a run of the protocol, 
apparently with the server agreeing on data. 
Later, the server will perform 
Commit.S.T.[ID,K,R1,R2] event at the end 
of its part of the protocol, which means the 
server has finished the protocol with the tag 
agreeing on the received data. Similarly, 
before the server sends M3, it performs 
Running.S.T.[ID,K,R1,R2], and when the 
tag receives M3 it performs 
Commit.T.S.[ID,K,R1,R2]. 
2) Resistance to impersonation attack: The 
server performs a Running event such as 
Running.S.T.ID.R2, which means that the 
server starts a run of the protocol, 
apparently with the tag, agreeing on ID and 
R2 in M2. Then, the server performs 
Running.S.T.K.R1.R2, which means that the 
server agrees on K, R1 and R2 in M1. Later, 
the tag will perform the Commit.T.S.ID.R2 
and Commit.T.S.K.R1.R2 events at the end 
of its part of the protocol, which means that 
the tag has finished the protocol with the 
server agreeing on the values of ID, K, R1 
and R2. 
3) Tag anonymity is depicted as 
Claim_Secret.T.S.ID and 
Claim_Secret.T.S.K and 
Claim_Secret.T.S.R2 events, which means 
that the three values of ID, K and R2 should 
be kept secret between the tag and the 
server. 
4) Resistance to replay attack is illustrated as a 
scenario where the tag is engaging in the 
protocol twice. The tag firstly runs the 
protocol with the server, and the intruder 
obtains R1. Then, the intruder runs the 
protocol with the same tag and resends R1 
to the tag. Therefore, in our protocol the tag 
will not perform the Commit event as it 
received the same random number R1. 
Similarly, if the server engages in the 
protocol run by receiving duplicate 
messages from the intruder or the tag, it will 
not perform the Running event. 
     We prepared the CasperFDR script to show some 
indicative results if there is an attack on the protocol 
or not. The script is shown in Appendix A. The 
section #Specification, specifies the security and 
authentication requirements of the protocol, the lines 
Secret (T, K, [S]), Secret (T, ID, [S]), and Secret (T, 
R2, [S]), indicate that the values of K, ID, and R2 
should only be known by the tag (T) and legitimate 
server (S). The lines starting with Agreement are for 
providing authentication for instance, Agreement (T, 
S, [R1, R2, ID, K]) means that the tag is 
authenticated to the server using the data values (R1, 
R2, ID, K). 
     In addition, in the #Intruder information section, 
the intruder is defined to be Mallory, who can take a 
full control of the session; he can impersonate any 
entity in the protocol, generate a random number, 
read the messages transmitted in the network, 
intercept, analyse, and/or modify messages.  
     CasperFDR did not find any feasible attacks on 
the proposed protocol. 
 
5.4 Formal analysis of the protocol using 
AVISPA 
 
     In addition to using CasperFDR for formally 
analyzing the proposed protocol, we presented our 
protocol using a High Level Protocol Specification 
Language (HLPSL), a specification language for 
formalizing protocols [20]. This language is then 
translated with the Automated Validation of Internet 
Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) 
model checker tool by using a translator called 
HLPSL2IF and four different integrated verification 
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backends called: On the Fly Model Checker(OFMC) 
[39], Constraint-Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-
AtSe) [40], SAT based Model-Checker (SATMC) 
[41] and Tree Automata based Protocol Analyser 
(TA4SP) [42]. These backends implement a variety 
of automatic analysis techniques to check the main 
goals of the protocol such as secrecy and 
authentication. 
     In these backends, the intruder is modelled via 
using the channel(dy) which stands for the Dolev-
Yao intruder model [43]. Under this model, the 
intruder has full control over the network, such that 
all messages sent by agents can be eavesdropped by 
the intruder. Moreover, the intruder may intercept, 
analyse, modify messages, and/or send any message 
he/she composes to other agents pretending to come 
from a legitimate agent.  
     In AVISPA, there are three roles. Firstly, basic 
role, which defines the agent who runs the protocol 
and the initial information and parameters the agent 
holds. Secondly, in the composition role, we describe 
the sessions of the protocol by specifying how the 
agents interact with each other. A top-level role 
environment role contains global constants and a 
composition of one or more sessions, where the 
intruder may play some roles as a legitimate user. 
Moreover, environment role shows what knowledge 
the intruder initially has. 
     The main requirements and goals are declared in a 
section called goal. There are two main goals in 
AVISPA namely secrecy and authentication. Secrecy 
is modelled via the goal predicate secret 
Authentication is modelled by means of the goal 
predicates witness and request. 
     The script is shown in Appendix B. To elaborate 
the script, there are two agents namely a server and a 
tag. We assume that the server acts as a reader and a 
database. The server and tag shares a symmetric key 
(K) and they both utilise a hash function (H) for the 
calculation of the messages. The tag ID, IDold and 
random numbers R1 and R2 are defined as text. ID 
defines IDnew. R1 and R2 are freshly generated using 
the new function. 
    In the script, authentication is achieved via witness 
and request goals i.e. witness(S, T, trid, ID) which 
declares that agent S asserts to be the peer of agent 
T, agreeing on the value ID, trid is the name of the 
ID authentication shown in the goal section. 
request(T,S,trid,Auth') can be read as “agent T 
accepts the value Auth1 and now relies on the 
guarantee that agent S exists and agrees with it on 
this value”. 
     Regarding secrecy, secret(ID,id,T,S) means that 
the value of ID should be a secret between agents T  
and S, and id is the name of the secret term, which is 
defined in the goal section.  
     In the environment role, the intruder is identified 
and we assume that the intruder knows the other 
agents (tag and server), keys he shares with the 
agents, and hash function. 
     Our protocol script has been analysed by the 
OFMC and CL-AtSe backends as they support an 
exclusive-OR properties. The results show that the 
protocol is safe. The other backends SATMC and 
TA4SP do not support an exclusive-OR property that 
is why the result shows inconclusive.  
 
5.5 Performance analysis 
 
     In this section, we conduct a comparative analysis 
of the performance cost regarding storage cost, and 
communication cost.  
  
a) Storage cost: Due to the limitation of tag 
memory, the tag should store minimum 
amount of data. In the proposed protocol, 
the tag stores two values in a rewritable 
flash memory namely (ID, K), as they 
change in different authentication sessions, 
each of which has a length of 224 bits. 
Since the tag’s memory can store 1 Kilobyte 
of data, in our protocol the tag securely 
stores 224*2=448 bits in the memory. 
Additional tag memory is necessary in our 
protocol to store a list of random numbers 
received from previous queries, for example 
by adding extended on-chip non-volatile 
memory on the RFID tags. 
b) Communication cost: In the proposed 
protocol, the tag sends three messages 
(HID, M1 and M2) in order to be 
successfully authenticated. A total of 672 
bits are sent over the channel as the length 
of one message is 224 bits. Hence, it 
provides a relatively low communication 
cost. 
6. Conclusion 
 
     In this paper we presented a lightweight RFID 
mutual authentication protocol that based on the 
strength found in previous protocols and prevent 
their deficiencies. The protocol has been informally 
and formally analysed using formal methods. Firstly, 
based on the informal analysis, the results 
demonstrate that the protocol performs better than 
the selected protocols and offers immunity against a 
broad range of attacks. Secondly, the privacy of the 
tag’s data is evaluated via the privacy model, which 
showed that the tag’s data cannot be traced or 
compromised. Thirdly, the secrecy and 
authentication requirements have been analysed via 
CasperFDR and AVISPA formal tools. CasperFDR 
and AVISPA did not show any feasible attacks. 
Finally, we conducted a performance comparative 
analysis in terms of storage, communication costs 
and server scalability, and we concluded that the 
proposed protocol is compatible with the RFID 
systems requirements. 
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Appendix A 
CasperFDR Script 
 
 
#Free variables  
T : Agent  
S : Server 
R1 : initialSeq 
R2 : Sequence 
IDold, ID : SessionID  
Kold , K : SessionKey 
h: HashFunction 
InverseKeys= (Kold,Kold), (K,K) ,  
(IDold,IDold)  , (ID , ID) 
#Protocol description 
0.    -> S : T  
1. S -> T : R1  
2a. T -> S : R2 (+) ID  
2b. T -> S : h(K, R1, R2)  
 [IDold = = ID and Kold = = K  
or ID = = ID and K == K ]  
4. S -> T : h(ID, K, R1, R2)  
#Processes 
RESPONDER(T, S, R2, K, ID)  
SERVER (S, T, R1, Kold, IDold, K, ID)  
#Actual variables 
Tag, Mallory : Agent 
ServerDB : Server 
Rr1 : initialSeq 
Rr2 : Sequence 
R3 : Sequence 
IDentityO,IDentityT:SessionID 
KeyOld, KeyTag : SessionKey 
InverseKeys=(KeyOld,KeyOld), 
(KeyTag, KeyTag), (IDentityO,IDentityO), 
,(IDentityT,IDentityT)  
#Specification 
Aliveness(S, T) 
Secret(T, K, [S]) 
Secret(T, ID, [S]) 
Secret(T, R2, [S]) 
Agreement(T, S, [R1, R2, ID,K]) 
Agreement(S, T, [R1, R2, ID,K])  
#System 
RESPONDER(Tag,ServerDB,Rr2,KeyTag,IDentityT) 
SERVER(ServerDB, Tag, Rr1, KeyOld, KeyTag 
IDentityO, IDentityT) 
#Intruder Information 
Intruder = Mallory 
IntruderKnowledge ={Tag,ServerDB,Mallory,R3} 
 
Appendix B 
AVISPA Script 
 
role server(S, T: agent,  
             
             K : symmetric_key, 
             H:hash_func, 
             SND, RCV: channel(dy)) 
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played_by S def= 
 
        local State: nat, 
        R1,R2, ID, IDold:text, 
        Auth1:hash(symmetric_key.text.text), 
        Kold : symmetric_key 
         
 
init State := 0 
 
transition 
 
0.  State = 0  /\ RCV(start) 
      =|>   State' := 1 
                    /\ R1' := new() 
                    /\ SND(R1') 
 
1. State = 3   /\  K' = K  /\ ID' = ID 
                    /\ RCV(H(K.R1.R2').xor(R2',ID)) =|> 
  State' := 4   /\ Auth1':= H(K.R1.R2')  
                    /\ request(S,T,id3,Auth1')  
                    /\ SND(H(ID.K.R1.R2'))  
                    /\ witness(S, T, trid, ID) 
                    /\ witness( S, T, trk, K) 
                    /\ ID':= new() 
                    /\ IDold' :=new() 
                    /\ K' := new() 
                    /\ Kold' := new() 
 
1.  State=3    /\  Kold'= K /\  IDold'= ID 
                    /\ RCV(h(K.R1.R2').xor(R2',ID)) =|> 
  State' := 4   /\ Auth1' := H(Kold.R1.R2')  
                    /\ request(S,T,id3,Auth1')  
                    /\ SND(H(IDold.Kold.R1.R2')) 
                    /\ witness(S, T, trid, IDold) 
                    /\ witness( S, T, trk, K) 
end role 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
role tag( T,S: agent, 
          K: symmetric_key, 
          H: hash_func, 
          SND,RCV: channel(dy)) 
played_by T def= 
 
        local State   : nat, 
        R1,R2 , ID: text, 
        Auth : hash(text. text.text) 
        
  init  State := 0 
 
  transition 
 
   0. State = 0  /\ RCV(R1') 
    =|> State' := 1 
                      /\ R2' := new() 
                      /\ SND(h(K.R1'.R2').xor(R2',ID))  
                      /\ witness( T, S, trid,ID) 
                      /\ witness( T, S, trk, K) 
       
      
   1. State = 1  /\ RCV(h(ID.K.R1'.R2')) 
 
   =|> State' := 2     
                      /\ Auth' := h(ID.K.R1'.R2')  
                      /\ request(T,S,trid,Auth') 
                      /\ secret(ID,id, {T, S}) 
                      /\ secret (R2', id2, {T, S}) 
                      /\ secret(K,id3, {T, S}) 
                      /\ ID':=new() 
                      /\ K' := new() 
       
end role 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
role session( T,S : agent, 
               K : symmetric_key, 
              Hash : hash_func) 
def= 
 
local SND, RCV: channel (dy) 
 
composition 
 
   tag(T,S,K,Hash, SND, RCV) 
   
/\ server (S,T,K,Hash, SND, RCV) 
end role 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
role environment( ) def= 
const 
id, id2, id3, id4, id5,trid, trk: protocol_id, 
h : hash_func, 
k, kti,ksi: symmetric_key, 
tag, server: agent 
 
intruder_Knowledge = {tag,server,h,i,kti,ksi} 
composition 
 
      session(tag,server,k,h) 
   /\ session(tag,i,kti,h) 
   /\ session(i,server,ksi,h) 
end role 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
goal 
 
secrecy_of id, id2, id3 
 
authentication_on trid 
 
authentication_on id3 
authentication_on trk 
 
end goal 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
environment() 
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Figure1. The proposed protocol requirement illustration in CasperFDR 
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